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Note
The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act:
A Disparate Impact on Native American Juveniles
Amy J. Standefer*
On June 10, 1996, Federal District Court Judge Bruce
Black faced an all too-familiar dilemma. Should he allow the
prosecution of fifteen-year-old Native American Jerry Paul C.
as an adult where he would face a long federal prison term, or
should he require the U.S. Attorney to proceed against Jerry as
a juvenile where he could receive a maximum of five years confinement in a juvenile detention center for the felony crimes of
murder, carjacking, and possession of a firearm?1 On the one
hand, a long prison term would greatly decrease Jerry's
chances of rehabilitation. On the other hand, detaining Jerry
for such a short period of time would not effectively dispel the
danger he posed to society. Limited by these unpalatable alternatives, Judge Black granted, with reservations, the government's motion to transfer Jerry to adult status pursuant to
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA).2 Judge Black
reasoned that because Jerry remained a risk to society, he was
forced to try him as an adult even though Jerry would face a
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A., The
American University, 1992; B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1989. I
would like to express my gratitude to Professor Barry Feld for his encouragement and invaluable assistance.
1. See United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406 (D.N.M. 1996);
Amended Motion to Proceed Against Defendant as an Adult at 2, Jerry Paul
C., 929 F. Supp. 1406 (No. 96-108 BB) (charging Jerry with felony murder in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 & 1153 (1994); caijacking resulting in death in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). A juvenile who is under
18 and declared a juvenile delinquent may only be held until he is 21 years
old. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c). A juvenile who committed a crime while a minor
but is adjudicated after his eighteenth birthday may be held for a maximum of
five years. See id.
2. See JerryPaul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1407; Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42. Section 5032 of the FJDA enables the federal government to obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile. See id.
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"disproportionately long, federal prison sentence [that was] the
of Jerry Paul C.'s jurisdictional status as a
unfortunate product
3
Native American."
As a result of his transfer to adult status as a federal defendant, the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines) subjected Jerry to a substantially
longer sentence than either tribal 4 or state courts generally
would have imposed.5 If a judge transfers a youthful offender
3. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1411. Jerry Paul C. is an enrolled
member of the Acoma Pueblo Indian tribe. See id. Jerry had already been
adjudicated as an adult and sentenced to ten years imprisonment by the State
of New Mexico for a separate incident that occurred on the same "night of terror" but fell within state criminal jurisdiction. Id. Although Jerry is Native
American, the crimes with which he was charged took place on state territory,
thereby subjecting him to state criminal jurisdiction. See id. The state court
of New Mexico convicted and sentenced Jerry Paul C. as an adult for the
crimes of armed robbery with a firearm enhancement, conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, and false imprisonment. See id. at 1408.
4. Congress has prevented tribal courts from imposing more than one
year in jail or $5,000 in fines with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994). ICRA initially limited the punishment a tribal
court could impose to six months imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both. See Robert N. Clinton, CriminalJurisdictionover IndianLands: A Journey Through a
JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 559 (1976). Congress enacted ICRA
to cure the perceived abuses of judicial power by the tribal courts. See id. at
561. For example, because tribal court hearings are informal, trial by jury is
generally waived and appeal mechanisms are either "chaotic or unavailable."
Id. Until the enactment of ICRA, however, tribal courts were not considered
arms of the federal government and therefore were not inherently bound by
constitutional limitations. See id. at 562. While ICRA apparently accepted
this view of tribal courts, it imposed a statutory list of constitutional-type
guarantees with which tribal courts must comply. See id.
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2 (1995) (establishing
strict sentencing guidelines, abolishing parole and reducing good behavior
adjustments) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]; Robert P. Crouch, Jr., Uncertain Guidepostson the Road to CriminalJusticeReform: ParoleAbolition and
Truth-in-Sentencing,2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 419, 422 (1994) (stating that the
federal system hits criminals with the "heavier hammer" of no parole and
mandatory minimum sentences); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Trying Juveniles in
Federal Court, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 45, 47 (stating that "'youth' is not
even a specific factor for a downward adjustment in a federal sentence under
the guidelines"). In Jerry Paul C., Judge Black used the handling of the state
action for the same "night of terror" to explain the discrepancy between state
and federal sentencing. 929 F. Supp. at 1408. The state of New Mexico convicted and sentenced Jerry as an adult for the crimes of armed robbery with a
firearm enhancement, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and false imprisonment. See id. The state court sentenced Jerry to a prison term of 120
months (10 years). See id. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Jerry
would have been subject to a sentence of 87 to 108 months, plus 60 consecutive
months for the use of a firearm while committing a violent crime. See id. Further, New Mexico allows those serving time "to earn good time credits at the
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for trial as an adult in the state courts, the criminal sentence is
usually half as long with an opportunity for parole or greater
allowances for "good time."6 Jerry Paul C. highlights the disproportionate consequences Native American juveniles often
face as a result of their jurisdictional status. As a Native
American youth committing a felony crime on an Indian reservation, Jerry falls within federal criminal jurisdiction. 7 If Jerry
were non-Indian, he would have been subject to state jurisdiction, not federal jurisdiction, and he would have been sentenced
according to New Mexico's sentencing guidelines. 8 Thus, based
solely on his status as a Native American, Jerry faced the
graver consequences of federal prosecution. 9 Jerry Paul C.
raises the issue of whether transferring juveniles to adult
status under the FJDA is in the best interest of justice where
the majority of juveniles transferred are Native American.
This Note argues that subjecting Native American juveniles to federal sentencing based purely on their jurisdictional
status does not serve the interests of justice. Sentencing
American Indian juveniles to longer sentences is in direct conflict with the federal system's goals of reserving criminal prosecution for the most serious instances of juvenile criminal conduct and reducing the occurrences in which minority
defendants receive longer sentences than white defendants.
Part I provides a brief overview of § 5032 of the FJDA and federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Part II explores
the constitutionality of subjecting Native American juveniles to
rate of 30 days for every month served." Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-234 (Michie 1990). By contrast, the federal system limits good time to 54 days
per year. See JerryPaul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1408.
6. See Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1407. The court acknowledged that
the "[glood time in the federal system is limited to fifty-four days per year.
The effect, of course, is that Indian youths tried as adults in the federal system
serve a substantially larger percentage of their originally larger sentences
than non-Indian youths tried as adults in the State courts." Id. at 1408. The
federal government also requires that criminal offenders serve at least eightyfive percent of the imposed sentence. See Symposium, Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 763, 766 (1995). In
1987, the federal government abolished parole and adopted mandatory minimum sentences for certain categories of crimes. See Crouch, supra note 5, at
420.
7. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); infra notes 71-85 and
accompanying text.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1407; infra notes
71-85 (discussing the Major Crimes Act and how its application affects Native
American defendants).
9. See supra notes 5-6 (contrasting New Mexico's sentencing guidelines
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
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federal criminal jurisdiction where they will face more severe
consequences for their actions based solely on their classification as Indians. Part III introduces alternatives to the current
practice that would reduce the disparate impact the FJDA has
on Indian juveniles without disturbing the integrity of the federal judicial system. This Note concludes that Congress could
remedy the disparity by presuming tribal court jurisdiction
over Indian juveniles as it already does with state and other local courts. The federal government would be able to rebut this
presumption by showing either that the tribal government did
not have or refused to exercise jurisdiction over the juvenile or
that the tribal government did not have available services and
programs adequate for the needs of the juvenile. In addition,
Congress should formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in the federal sentencing of Indian juveniles who face
federal adult prosecution based solely on their jurisdictional
status rather than the seriousness of the criminal offense.
I.

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
SENTENCING: HISTORY AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS

A. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER JUVENILES

In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (Act of 1974).10 The Act of 1974 promised to improve the quality of juvenile justice and provided a
comprehensive, coordinated approach to juvenile delinquency. 11
The Act of 1974 amended the FJDA, which virtually had been
unchanged since its congressional enactment in 1938.12 Section
10. S. REP. NO. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283,
5283.
11. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, §§ 101-545,
88 Stat. 1109, 1109-43 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1994)).
The Act of 1974 was enacted to provide "[flederal leadership and coordination
of the resources necessary to develop and implement at the State and local
community level effective programs for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency." S. REP. No. 93-1011, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283,
5283.
12. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284.
The Senate Judiciary Committee believed that it needed to update the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act by incorporating the due process rights recently
granted to juvenile proceedings in the landmark Supreme Court decision In re
Gault. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284; see also In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 31-58 (1967) (granting juveniles due process rights including ade-
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5032 of the FJDA allows the Attorney General to initiate delinquency proceedings against juveniles in federal courts.' 3 It also
permits the criminal prosecution of juveniles as adults.14
The purpose of the FJDA is to "remove juveniles from the
ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior
criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation." 15 Juvenile justice is premised on the belief that juveniles
are less culpable than adults for their criminal acts due to their
lack of experience and poor judgment. 16 The Supreme Court
has stated that although crimes committed by minors are just
as harmful to the victims as those committed by adults, juveniles "deserve less punishment because adolescents may have
less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms than adults." 17 Accordingly, the FJDA reflects the assumption that minors who have committed a wrong or criminal
quate and timely notice of charges, the right to an attorney, privilege against
self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The FJDA defines 'juvenile" as "a person who
has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and
disposition under this chapter for an alleged act ofjuvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5031. "Juvenile delinquency" is defined as "the violation of a law of the United States
committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been
a crime if committed by an adult or a violation by such a person of section
922(x)." Id.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031; see also infra notes 28-42 (describing circumstances under which a juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult in federal

court).
15. United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994);
see also S. REP. No. 93-1011, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 5283, 5284 ("The
bill also amends the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act... to provide basic
procedural rights for juveniles who come under Federal jurisdiction and to
bring Federal procedures up to the standards set by various model acts, many
state codes and court decisions."); Jean M. Radler, Annotation, Treatment Under FederalJuvenile Delinquency Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042) of Juvenile Alleged to Have Violated Law of United States, 137 A.L.R. FED. 481, 496 (1997)
(stating that the FJDA "provides rehabilitation rather than punishment, apparently based on the belief that... a juvenile is more amenable to rehabilitation than an adult").
16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (proclaiming
that "the [Supreme] Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult"); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, CriminalResponsibility,and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68, 114 (1997) (explaining that juvenile criminal acts are "less
blameworthy not simply because of reduced culpability and limited appreciation of consequences but because their life-situations have understandably
limited their capacity to learn to make fully responsible choices").
17. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted).
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act will be proceeded against as juveniles, not adults. 18 Thus, a
juvenile delinquency proceeding under the FJDA is not a
criminal conviction but an adjudication of status.1 9
Although the FJDA provides federal courts with jurisdiction over juveniles, it includes a certification procedure with
which the Attorney General must comply in order to secure
federal jurisdiction over a juvenile. 20 In order to initiate
charges against a minor in federal court, the Attorney General2 l must demonstrate to the federal district court judge that:
(1) the state2u juvenile court does not have, or refuses to exer18. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 ("A juvenile who is alleged to have committed an
act of juvenile delinquency and who is not surrendered to State authorities
shall be proceeded against under this chapter unless he has requested in
writing upon advice of counsel to be proceeded against as an adult .... ").
19. See One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 844 ("A successful prosecution under the [Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act] does not result in a criminal conviction but rather in an adjudication that the defendant has entered into a
state of juvenile delinquency." (quoting United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d
1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1991))); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220
(10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that "[u]nder this act, prosecution results in an
adjudication of status-not a criminal conviction"); United States v. Allen, 574
F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that a "finding of delinquency under the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is an adjudication of status, not a conviction
for a crime"); Stacie S. Polashuk, Following the Lead of the Indian Child Welfare Act: Expanding Tribal Court Jurisdictionover Native American Juvenile
Delinquents, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1996) (declaring that "[t]he Act
does not create a substantive offense with its own jurisdictional basis, but
rather establishes a procedural mechanism for the treatment ofjuveniles who
are already subject to federal jurisdiction because of the commission of acts
cognizable under other federal criminal statutes" (citation and multiple quotation marks omitted)).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (N.D.
Iowa 1997).
21. The Attorney General may delegate her power of certification to the
U.S. Attorney's Office of the appropriate federal district. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.57
(1999); see also United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 859-60 (1996) (holding
that "the Attorney General may delegate her power to the Assistant Attorney
General who may in turn delegate his power to the United States Attorneys
who may delegate their power to the Assistant United States Attorneys");
United States v. Dennison, A.L., 652 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D.N.M. 1986) (rejecting argument that certification was deficient because filed by U.S. Attorney
rather than Attorney General, since power to certify has been properly delegated to the U.S. Attorney).
22. Section 5032 defines "State" as a "State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Indian tribes are not included within the
statutes definition of a "State." See id. The definition of Indian tribes used
for the purposes of the FJDA is provided by the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994). The
ISDEAA defines "Indian tribe" as any "Indian tribe, band, nation, or other or-
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cise, jurisdiction over the minor; (2) the state lacks adequate
programs or services for the minor; or (3) the offense charged is
a firearms offense, a drug trafficking offense or importation offense, or a violent felony, and there is a "substantial Federal interest"2 3 in the case or offense to warrant federal jurisdiction. 24
Examples of cases warranting a substantial federal interest include participation in large scale-drug trafficking, willful destruction of U.S. property, and the assassination of a federal official. 25 If the U.S. Attorney does not meet these requirements,
the juvenile will be "surrendered" to the legal authorities of the
state. 26 If the requirements are met, the appropriate federal
district court will oversee the proceedings. 27
ganized group or community... which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of
their status as Indians." Id.
23. Congress added the "substantial Federal interest" requirement to
§ 5032 in 1984. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) [hereinafter CCCA of 1984]. Congress stated
that a finding of "substantial Federal interest" should be based on the nature
of the offense or whether "the circumstances of the case give rise to special
Federal concerns." H.R. REP. No. 98-1030 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The third certification provision was added to
the certification provisions of § 5032 as part of the CCCA of 1984. See CCCA
of 1984, supra note 23. Congress stated that it was adding the third category
so that juvenile delinquency cases dealing with serious felony offenses would
be handled by federal proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3529. Congress provided the following examples as cases involving a substantial federal interest: "assault on, or assassination of, a Federal official, an aircraft hijacking, a kidnapping where State boundaries are crossed, a major espionage or sabotage offense, participation in large-scale drug trafficking, or
significant and willful destruction of property belonging to the United States."
Id. Congress stated that it was limiting the category of substantial federal interest and violent felonies so that the federal government would continue to
defer to state authorities for less serious offenses. See id.; see also, e.g., United
States v. NJB, 104 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a substantial federal
interest in the criminal act of killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise since the legislative history of FJDA expressly includes "large scale
drug trafficking' as an example of an offense that raises special federal concerns"); United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1321 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding the crime of caijacking to be an act of substantial federal interest because Congress had federalized the crime by statute and imposed harsh penalties for its commission). But see, e.g., United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F.
Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1994) (declaring that a single instance of bank robbery does not raise a substantial federal interest).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d at 1319
(stating that "there is a clear congressional intent to limit the types of cases
that the executive should bring in federal court"); Major Richard L. Palmatier,
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Even though Congress created the FJDA to remove juveniles from the criminal process, the federal government retains
the authority to place them there. 28 There are two provisions
by which a minor may be prosecuted as an adult: a discretion29
ary transfer provision and a mandatory transfer provision.
The discretionary provision requires a case-by-case judicial determination of whether prosecuting the minor is justifiable,
whereas the mandatory provision automatically assumes
criminal jurisdiction over repeat juvenile offenders. 30 The provision by which a juvenile will be transferred to adult status
depends upon the juvenile's age, the nature of prior criminal
31
acts, and the seriousness of the present offense charged.
Either the Attorney General or the juvenile may initiate a
transfer under the discretionary provision. 32 A juvenile, upon
the advice of counsel, may wish to be tried as an adult in order
to be protected by the procedural safeguards granted to
adults.3 3 For example, because a juvenile does not enjoy the
constitutional right to a trial by jury, the juvenile can only receive a jury trial if he or she is tried as an adult. 34 It is more
likely, however, that the Attorney General will move to treat
Jr., Criminal Offenses by Juveniles on the FederalInstallation:A Primer on 18
U.S.C. § 5032, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1994, at 3 (opining that by creating federal
jurisdiction over juveniles, the Act of 1974 "broke with the history of reserving
the matter for the individual states[,]" but added that the certification provisions of § 5032 demonstrated Congress's presumption that juvenile matters
are best handled by state authorities).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. This provision applies only to those juveniles who purportedly
have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, but have not been turned over
to the legal authorities of the state. See id. In order to be prosecuted as an
adult, the juvenile must be fifteen years or older, except in the case of a crime
involving a firearm where a juvenile thirteen years or older may be transferred to adult status. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also United States v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219,
1223 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (declaring that "the juvenile is generally subject to be
proceeded against in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless the juvenile requests to be proceeded against as an adult or the district court, upon motion
by the United States Attorney General and after a hearing, determines that
transfer to adult criminal prosecution would be 'in the interest ofjustice").
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
34. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 529 (1971) (denying juveniles the right to trial by jury); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing
that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury").
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the juvenile as an adult.35 In order to do so, the Attorney General must file a transfer motion with the appropriate district
court judge who conducts a hearing to determine whether the
transfer would be "in the interest of justice."36 In assessing
whether treating the youth as an adult is appropriate, the
judge must consider and make findings in the record on six factors, such as the age of the juvenile, the seriousness of the offense, and the availability of treatment centers geared toward
37
the juvenile's needs.
Juveniles may also be transferred automatically to a district court for criminal prosecution under the mandatory transfer provision. 38 The mandatory provision requires a district
35. See, e.g., Juvenile KJ.C., 976 F. Supp. at 1223.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 ("[C]riminal prosecution on the basis of the alleged
act may be begun by motion to transfer of the Attorney General in the appropriate district court of the United States, if such court finds, after hearing,
such transfer would be in the interest ofjustice."); see also, e.g., United States
v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that a motion
to transfer a juvenile to adult status is granted when "the risk of harm to society posed by affording the defendant more lenient treatment within the juvenile justice system outweighs the defendant's chance for rehabilitation"). The
federal government bears the burden of showing whether the juvenile's transfer to adult status is in the interests of justice. See Juvenile KJ.C., 976 F.
Supp. at 1224. The government's burden of proof, however, is only that of a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171
(8th Cir. 1992); Juvenile KJ.C., 976 F. Supp. at 1224.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The six factors, in full, are the following:
the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the
juveniles response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
Id. Section 5032 also requires the court to consider "the extent to which the
juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced
other persons to take part in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or firearms." Id. The statute further provides
that "[s]uch a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to
adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a transfer."
Id. Courts have applied these factors in various manners. Compare United
States v. Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that a court is
not required to give equal weight to each factor), and One Juvenile Male, 40
F.3d at 845-46 (stating that a court may give greater weight to the nature of
the alleged offense than the other factors), with United States v. Juvenile JG,
139 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[iun weighing these factors the
court must balance the likelihood of rehabilitation before the juvenile reaches
majority with the risk of harm to the public from treating violent crime more
leniently").
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Congress added the mandatory transfer provision in 1984 as part of the CCCA of 1984. See CCCA of 1984, supra note 23.
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court to transfer the juvenile to adult status if: (1) the minor
was at least sixteen when the alleged act was committed; (2)
the charged offense would be a felony if committed by an adult
and has an element of physical violence or is a controlled substance offense specifically enumerated in the statute; and (3)
the minor has previously been convicted of an act (which if
committed by an adult would be a felony) of violence or controlled substance offense provided by the statute. 39 Although
the statute does not expressly provide for a judicial hearing under the mandatory provision, courts will hold hearings to ensure that all three factors are present before the transfer occurs. 40 The judge need not make a finding of whether the
transfer is in the interest of justice.4 1 Consequently, if all three
factors are met, the juvenile automatically faces criminal
prosecution regardless of whether the transfer is in the youth's
best interest. Before the juvenile may be prosecuted, however,
the Attorney General must first certify to the court that no
state or local entity has the authority to proceed against the
youth. 42 Federal judges sentence juveniles tried as adults under the Sentencing Guidelines and impose guideline sentences
equivalent to what an adult would receive for the same offense. 43 Most juveniles, however, are proceeded against in
45
state court, 44 with the exception of Native Americans.
Congress stated it was adding the mandatory provision to extend federal jurisdiction to youths committing particularly serious offenses but reiterated
that generally the matter would be preserved for the states. See H.R. REP.
No. 98-1030 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529. Congress
stated that it was preserving "the principles that criminal prosecution should
be reserved for only the most dangerous juvenile offenders and permitted only
when merited under the facts of a particular case." Id., reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3531.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. at 1223 n.8 (listing
the three factors required to transfer a juvenile to adult status under the
mandatory transfer provisions).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also, e.g., United States v. David H., 29 F.3d
489, 492 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("Since both mandatory and discretionary transfer depend on the existence of particular (although different) facts, a
court must hold a hearing and make findings before a transfer may occur.").
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; David H., 29 F.3d at 492.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; H.R. REP. No. 98-1030 (1984), reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3529 n.10.
43. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 5, § 1B1.12.
44. The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice
(Bureau) estimates that in 1992, 11,700 juvenile delinquency cases were
transferred to state criminal court by judicial waiver. See MELISSA
SICKMuND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, How JUvENILEs GET TO CRIMINAL COURT
1 (1994). This figure does not include transfer by prosecutorial discretion or

19991

FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCYACT

483

American Indian juveniles charged with a felony offense
committed in Indian country 46 are subject to federal jurisdiction.47 Tribal courts only retain exclusive jurisdiction where
both the perpetrator and the victim are Native American and
48
the charged offense does not fall under the Major Crimes Act.
Consequently, despite Congress's desire to keep juveniles in the
statutory exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction. See id. By contrast, the
Bureau estimates that in 1994 only 65 juveniles were referred to the Attorney
General for transfer to adult status. See JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (1997).
The Bureau did not have any estimates on how many juveniles were directly
charged as adults based on their prior criminal records. See id.
45. In 1997, the total number of Native American juvenile offenders entering federal prison was 137, as compared with the following non-Indian juvenile offenders: 5 Asian; 13 African-American; and 34 Caucasian. See Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center (visited June 25, 1999) <http:/llsrc.
urban.org>; see also United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406, 1407
(D.N.M. 1997) (stating that the transfer to adult status within the federal system and, thus, the sentencing under the federal guidelines "catches only a
small class of individuals: those who voluntarily enter federal enclaves and
facilities, or Native Americans"); SCALIA, supra note 44, at 3 (providing that
61% ofjuvenile delinquents confined by the Federal Bureau are Native Americans); Palmatier, supra note 26, at 7 ("Much of the federal case law deals with
incidents occurring on Indian reservations.").
46. "Indian Country" is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government... including rights-ofway running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States ... (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151.
47. See id. §§ 1152-53, 5032; infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (explaining federal jurisdiction over Indian country).
48. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (describing the Major
Crimes Act, which includes such crimes as arson, murder, assault with intent
to kill and burglary); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977)
("Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all crimes
committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country
are subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal courts."); United States v. Johnson,
637 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[E]xcept for the crimes specifically enumerated in section 1153, the general rule is that tribal courts have retained
exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian country."). But see infra note 78 and accompanying text (arguing that tribal and federal governments have concurrent jurisdiction over major felony offenses). States do not have jurisdiction over Native Americans
who commit crimes on Indian reservations unless Congress has specifically
granted the state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Blackwolfv. District Court, 493 P.2d
1293 (Mont. 1972). In Blackwolf, the court stated that "[iut is abundantly clear
that state court jurisdiction in Indian affairs on reservations does not exist in
the absence of an express statutory grant of such jurisdiction by Congress .... " Id. at 1295.
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state or local system,49 the federal government may assume jurisdiction over Indian juveniles charged with serious offenses
without obtaining tribal consent.5 0 Thus, the government may
prosecute a fifteen year-old Native American youth as an adult
without conferring with the tribe. 5 1 The government may not,
however, prosecute a thirteen or fourteen year-old 52 Indian
child as an adult, unless the tribal government has refused jurisdiction.53 If the transfer is granted, the juvenile faces more
severe consequences than her non-Indian counterpart who
would be prosecuted as an adult in state court.5 4 Although
some federal court judges are disturbed by the discrepancy,
49. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (excluding "tribes" from the statute's definition of
a state); United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1988)
("The language and history [of § 5032] provide no basis for assuming that
Congress intended Indian juveniles otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction
under the Major Crimes Act to be subject to tribal jurisdiction."); United
States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the plain
meaning of the statute limits its applicability to the exercise of concurrent
state jurisdiction and to the availability of state facilities).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The Congressional Minority of the 105th Congress argued that out of traditional respect for tribal sovereignty, Indian
Tribes should have a say in determining whether the Attorney General will
prosecute Native American juveniles when the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is that the crime occurred in Indian country. See S. REP. No. 105-108, at
185 (1997).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. In 1994, Congress amended § 5032 to allow for
the prosecution ofjuveniles thirteen years of age and older for "serious violent
federal felonies of assault or murder, and, in cases where the juvenile possessed a firearm during the offense, bank robbery, robbery, rape, or the sexual
abuse of a child." H.R. REP. No. 103-465, at 2 (1994). Congress stated that it
was adding this provision "to allow the Federal government to prosecute as
adults those juveniles who have committed truly heinous and egregious
crimes, and who show little likelihood of responding to rehabilitative efforts."
Id.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The tribal "opt-in" clause was also added in
1994 "in recognition of the fact that the great majority of Federal juvenile
prosecutions involve Native American youth." See S. REP. No. 105-108, at 185
(1997).
54. See United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (D.N.M.
1996); see also United States v. Anthony Y., 990 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (D.N.M.
1998) (referencing Judge Black's comments in Jerry Paul C. and noting that
"Native American juveniles in New Mexico who commit crimes in Indian
Country and who are transferred to adult status in federal court face much
longer terms of incarceration than do juveniles who are prosecuted in the New
Mexico state court system"); CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 1 (1994) (stating
that on average, federal inmates are expected to serve 6.5 years on a sentence
of 10.5 years and state inmates are expected to serve 5.5 years on a 12.5 year
sentence).
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they are legally obligated to follow the transfer provisions of
the FJDA.5 5 In order to provide a complete analysis of this issue, it is necessary to review the extent to which the federal
government exercises criminal jurisdiction over Indian country.
B. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN COUNTRY
The United States government originally treated Indian
tribes as separate, independent nations.5 6 Treaties were the
primary source of coordinating relations between the federal
government and Native Americans. 57 With this arrangement,
Indian tribes generally retained their sovereignty and jurisdiction over internal tribal matters.5 8 In 1871, the practice of creating Indian law by treaty ended when Congress decided that
59
statutes rather than treaties would control Indian affairs.
55. See United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1225 (D.N.M. 1998)
("[A] transfer order will result in a teenager being incarcerated with repeat
offenders for decades."); Anthony Y., 990 F. Supp. at 1313 ("The disproportionate sentences for Native American youth.., deeply trouble me, especially
when I consider that any transfer to adult status should be 'in the interest of
justice.' Nevertheless, I must apply the Juvenile Delinquency Act as Congress
has written it...." (citation omitted)); Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. at 1408 ("In
spite of what appears to be a very disparate impact on those, mostly Indian,
juveniles who are subject to the jurisdiction of the federal criminal system,
this Court is obligated to follow federal law and deal with Jerry Paul C. under
the six factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 5032.").
56. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832) (stating
that the United States treated the Indian nations as sovereign when it succeeded the British Crown); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16
(1831) (recognizing the Cherokee nation "as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself');
Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPast and Present: Colonialism,Constitutionalism, and Interpretationin Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381, 399
(1993) (stating that the opinions of Cherokee Nation and Worcester reflected
Chief Justice Marshall's general presumptions that "prior to discovery, tribes
possessed complete, inherent sovereignty; that discovery had reduced their
sovereignty only with respect to external sovereign relations; and that in the
treaty-making process neither Great Britain nor the United States had sought
to interfere with internal tribal governance").
57. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 558; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 16. The President had exclusive authority, subject to Senate ratification, to enter into treaties with the various tribes. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2;
id. art. VI.
58. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 581; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 16.
59. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994) ("No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty...."). Section 71, however, left intact those treaties already in force.
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Thereafter, Congress subjected Indian tribes and their members to direct legislation regardless of whether tribal members
gave their consent. 60 Seeking to diminish tribal sovereignty
further, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885 that
departed from the government's long-held policy of reserving
for Indian tribe's1 control over intra-Indian crimes committed in
6
Indian country.
Although the Major Crimes Act dealt a great blow to Indian self-government, federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian
country existed prior to its enactment.6 2 In 1817, Congress
passed the General Crimes Act to permit punishment of all
crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country in addition
to some crimes committed by Native Americans against nonIndians. 63 The General Crimes Act was an extension of the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA)64 that covered those areas under
exclusive federal jurisdiction (i.e., federal enclaves) that were
devoid of any criminal law infrastructure. 65 The ACA allowed
the federal government to apply state criminal law to federal
enclaves, such as military installations or national parks, when
66
no federal statute existed to prosecute the offender's conduct.
Neither the General Crimes Act nor the ACA, however, created
state jurisdiction over Indian country. 67 Although the General
Crimes Act appeared to grant broad authority and jurisdiction
over Indian country, it included three important limitations
that afforded Indian tribes a substantial measure of selfgovernment. 68 For example, it exempted from federal jurisdicSee id.; see also Frickey, supra note 56, at 421 n.164 (asserting that the House
of Representatives replaced treaties with legislation because it "demanded a
role in federal Indian policy").
60. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886).
61. See Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
62. See General Crimes Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (1817) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994)).
63.

See WMLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL

122 (2nd ed. 1988); Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 332 (1989).
64. See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
65. See id.; CANBY, supra note 63, at 122.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 13.
67. See id. §§ 13, 1152.
68. See id. § 1152. The second paragraph of§ 1152 provides:
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished
by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipula-
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tion crimes committed by one Indian against another Indian on
Indian country (i.e., intra-Indian crimes). 69 Nevertheless, conAct substantially
gressional enactment of the Major Crimes
70
undermined this intra-Indian exception.
The Major Crimes Act gave the federal government jurisdiction over eight specified crimes committed within Indian
country. 7 1 Congress enacted the statute in response to Ex parte
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court decision holding that tribal
72
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes.
Displeased with this decision, Congress effectively overturned
Ex parte Crow Dog and provided for federal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Native Americans against either Indians
or non-Indians in Indian country.7 3 Thereafter, the Supreme
Court upheld the Major Crimes Act as a legitimate exercise of
congressional power over Indian tribes. 74 The Court explained
that because "Indian tribes are the wards of the nation" and
therefore dependent upon the federal government for their protection, daily food, and political rights, Congress may extend
federal jurisdiction to intra-Indian offenses committed on Indian reservations.7 5 Today, the Major Crimes Act includes
fourteen enumerated crimes and remains the major federal jurisdictional statute for offenses committed by Native Americans
on tribal land.76 Although the statute states that the federal
tions, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Id.; see also Clinton, supra note 4, at 524 (declaring that "the coverage of section 1152 is far more limited than the language suggests" because of the numerous situations excepted from coverage).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
70. See id. 88 1152-53; Clinton, supra note 4, at 524 (stating that the federal policy of affording tribal governments a measure of self-governance by excluding from federal jurisdiction intra-Indian crimes was undermined by the
enactment of the Major Crimes Act).
71. See Major Crimes Act, ch. 321, §§ 328-29, 35 Stat. 1151 (1909) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)). The original eight enumerated
crimes included: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, and larceny. See id.
72. 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
74. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886); see also
CANBY, supra note 63, at 105-06 ("The Major Crimes Act was the first systematic intrusion by the federal government into the internal affairs of the tribes.
The Supreme Court held that this exercise of congressional power was justified by the dependent status of the tribes as wards of the federal government.").
75. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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government has "exclusive" jurisdiction over these crimes, 7 7 it

is unsettled whether the Major Crimes Act actually divests
tribal courts of jurisdiction over crimes covered under the stat78

ute.

In sum, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian defendants for all crimes not covered under the General
Crimes Act or the Major Crimes Act.7 9 Federal courts arguably
have exclusive jurisdiction over all major crimes committed on
Indian country80 unless both the perpetrator and victim are
non-Indian, in which case the state has jurisdiction.8' Federal
courts also exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonIndians against Indians8 2 and all acts made criminal only by

federal law.8 3 State courts do not have jurisdiction over any of-

fenses committed by or against Native Americans on Indian
land unless Congress has expressly delegated jurisdiction to
that state.8 4 It is important to note, however, that although the
77. See id.
78. See Pommersheim, supra note 63, at 333. Some commentators have
maintained that federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act may only be
exclusive against the states, not tribal governments. See Vincent C. Milani,
The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal Courts: Tribal Sovereignty
and Congressional Control, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1994). Milani
explains that both the Supreme Court and Congress have expressed uncertainty as to whether the Major Crimes Act deprives a tribal court of jurisdiction. See id. at 1286 n.39. Robert Clinton also argues that tribal courts may
share concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over major crimes.
See Clinton, supra note 4, at 559. Clinton argues that nothing in the text or
legislative history of the Major Crimes Act indicates that Congress "intended
to extinguish concurrent tribal jurisdiction over serious offenses" committed
on Indian land involving an Indian perpetrator and victim. Id. at 559 n.295;
see also Statement for the Record Before Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d
Cong. (1995) (statement of Joseph A. Myers, Executive Director of National
Indian Justice Center), available in 1995 WL 50663. Mr. Myers declared that
the Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act trigger concurrent tribal
and federal jurisdiction. See id., available in 1995 WL 50663 at *12.
79. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977); United
States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Allen,
574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
81. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (holding
that state courts, not federal courts, have jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes against non-Indians on Indian land).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
83. See id. § 13. Examples of federal criminal acts include "counterfeiting,
treason, assaulting a federal officer and tampering with the mail." STEPHEN
L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANs AND TRIBEs: AN AMERIcAN CivIL LIBERTIES
UNION HANDBOOK 121 (1983).
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162. Section 1162(a) granted six states (Alaska,
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin) exclusive criminal
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federal government has limited tribal court criminal jurisdiction, it continues to recognize American Indian tribes as selfgoverning5 entities and encourages tribal autonomy and devel8
opment.
As a result of federal criminal jurisdiction over major felonies in Indian country, many Native Americans are sentenced
according to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. This is problematic because individuals convicted in federal court are generally subject to8 6harsher penalties than those convicted in state
or tribal courts.

C. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THE
ABOLITION OF PAROLE AND SPECIFIC OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS AS MITIGATING FACTORS

Formerly, federal criminal sentencing was based upon a
rehabilitative model where the federal judge had wide discretion to assess a criminal defendant's prospects for rehabilitajurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country,
excluding a few Indian reservations and non-major intra-Indian crimes. See
id. Section 1162 originally allowed other states to assert criminal jurisdiction
over Indian territory voluntarily, but the statute was amended in 1968 to require tribal consent before assuming jurisdiction. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (1994)). This Notes analysis, however, only pertains to those jurisdictions in which the federal government has not withdrawn its criminal jurisdiction over Indian country and granted it to the states.
85. See Janet Reno, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Policy
on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-Government Relations with Indian
Tribes (last modified Apr. 9, 1998) <http'//www.usdoj/otj/sovtrb.html> [hereinafter Departmentof Justice Policy] (stating that the "Department [of Justice]
recognizes that Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations retain sovereign
powers, except as divested by the United States, and further recognizes that
the United States has the authority to restore federal recognition of Indian
sovereignty in order to strengthen tribal self-governance"); William C. Canby,
Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1,
1 (1987); see also, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3613 (1994) (providing financial assistance for the development, enhancement, and operation
of tribal justice systems); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450, 455-58 (1994). But cf., Milani, supra note 78, at 1291
(stating that a tribe "retains as much of its sovereignty as is not legislated
away by Congress or ceded through consensual treaty"). The basic principle of
federal Indian policy is that "tribal powers are inherent, but they can be extinguished by Congress." PEVAR, supra note 83, at 69. Pevar maintains that despite congressional ability to restrict tribal power, "Indian tribes retain an
enormous amount of authority, especially with respect to regulating reservation activities and the conduct of tribal members." Id. at 70.
86. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (explaining that federal
sentences are substantially longer than either state or tribal court sentences,
providing no chance for parole and fewer allowances for good time).
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tion and sentence accordingly.8 7 The judge's unregulated discretion, however, produced widely disparate sentences for offenders convicted of the same crime.88 This was especially true
for minorities who received longer prison terms than their
white counterparts. 89 In an effort to provide greater certainty
and uniformity in sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act (Reform Act) that rejected the concepts of rehabilitation, indeterminate sentencing, and parole release.9 0 Pursuant to the Reform Act, the United States Sentencing Commission 91 created federal sentencing guidelines that abolished
parole, created fixed mandatory minimum sentences and specifically excluded reliance on offender characteristics, such as
age or race, to justify departures from the guideline range.9 2 As
a result, a federal sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines is
based on the offense level of the crime charged, mitigating and
aggravating factors related only to the defendant's culpability
in the commission of the crime, and the individual's prior
criminal record. 93 A federal judge may not take into account an
87. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1179, 1186 (1993).
88. See Palcido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor,24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357, 362 (1994); Lear, supra note 87,
at 1188-89.
89. See Gomez, supra note 88, at 359 (providing that "[iun 1979, blacks accounted for 10.1% of this country's adult male population, yet occupied 48% of
the beds in our state prisons"); Lear, supra note 87, at 1189 (stating that before the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the federal system tended to
give minority offenders longer prison terms than their white counterparts).
90. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994)) [hereinafter Reform Act]; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (stating
that the Reform Act "rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation ... and it states that punishment should serve retributive, educational,
deterrent, and incapacitative goals"); Gomez, supra note 88, at 362; Lear, supra note 87, at 1189.
91. The Reform Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) to design sentencing guidelines for federal courts in determining
the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98.
92. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98. Section 994(d) provides
that "[t]he Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements
are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders." Id. § 994(d).
93. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1B1.1. The Reform Act does
provide, however, that the judge may depart from the guidelines in a particular case if he finds an aggravating or mitigating factor present (other than
those already discussed) that the Commission did not adequately consider
when formulating the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 367.
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offender's age or race to exercise leniency toward the defendant
or to impose a more rigid penalty. 94 Some commentators argue,
however, that prohibiting sentencing judges from considering
the individual characteristics of an offender are too restrictive
95
and often lead to the imposition of unjust sentences.
Most criminal offenders are prosecuted in the state system
and do not face the harsher consequences of the Sentencing
Guidelines; Native Americans are the exception. As a result of
their jurisdictional status, Native Americans often receive the
harsher federal penalty for committing crimes that are normally adjudicated in state court. Thus, American Indians have
argued that the disproportionate consequences they face under
the federal system violate their equal protection rights. 96 The
Supreme Court, however, has consistently upheld federal statutes that create substantial disparities between Indians and
non-Indians, reasoning that the statutes are not based on im97
permissible racial classifications.

D. FEDERAL REGULATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: POLITICAL
VERSUS RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."98

The Equal Protection Clause limits

Congress's ability to classify similarly-situated individuals into
groups for the purpose of treating them differently. 99 Racial
94. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1B1.1.
95. See Gomez, supra note 88, at 380 (stating that "race neutrality could
petrify, and may even amplify the effects of discrimination that have occurred
at earlier stages in the [criminal] process"); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court
Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failuresof Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L.
REV. 577, 586-87 (stating that mandatory minimum statutes force judges to
impose unjust sentences "because the judges are precluded from considering
the unique circumstances of offenders").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir.
1988).

97. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (stating
that the tribal court's exclusive jurisdiction derived from the "quasi-sovereign
status" of the tribe rather than the race of the plaintiff); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (stating that an employment hiring preference
for Native Americans was political rather than racial in nature).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. See id. The Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id.
amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.. . ."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (providing that although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection
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classifications are immediately suspect and receive heightened
judicial scrutiny.' °° Most other classifications are presumed
constitutional and receive a rational basis review. 10 1 Although
federal regulation of Native Americans might appear to be racially based, the Supreme Court has stated that the category
"Indian" is a political classification. 10 2 Because political classifications are non-suspect, legislation expressly singling out Native Americans as a group only warrants a rational basis review, and the statute is presumed to be constitutional. 10 3 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the category "Indian" is political
because federal regulation of Indian affairs is the governance of
a "once-sovereign political communit[y]" and not that of a "'racial' group consisting of 'Indians.'" 1°4
1. United States v. Antelope: The Constitutionality of
Subjecting Native American Offenders to Harsher Federal
Criminal Sanctions
In United States v. Antelope, the Supreme Court rejected
the claim that a federal criminal statute was unconstitutional
because it subjected Native American defendants to federal
prosecution by virtue of their status as "Indians." 10 5 In Antelope, a Native American was charged with killing a non-Indian

Clause, the denial of equal protection is so "unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process"); see also Kathryn A. McAluney, Equal Protection, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 1074, 1074 n.2 (1996) (explaining that the United States Supreme Court
uses three levels of review to determine whether a governmental classification
violates the Equal Protection Clause: strict scrutiny, intermediate level of
scrutiny, and rational basis review).
100. See McAluney, supra note 99, at 1074 n.2 ("Under strict scrutiny, a
classification will be upheld only if it is 'narrowly tailored,' or the 'east restrictive means' to a compelling government interest.").
101. See id. ("Rational basis review, the easiest level of review to satisfy,
merely requires that a classification have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state goal.").
102. See Fisher, 424 U.S. at 390 (stating that the tribal court's exclusive
jurisdiction derived from the "quasi-sovereign status" of the tribe rather than
the race of the plaintiff); Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (stating that an employment hiring preference for Native Americans was political rather than racial in nature).
103. See Fisher,424 U.S. at 391 (denying Indian tribal members access to
state court because giving tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter promoted Indian interests in self-government); Morton, 417 U.S. at 555
(holding that an employment hiring preference for Native Americans was rationally tied to Congress's unique obligation toward Indian tribes).
104. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
105. See id. at 646-47.
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woman. 0 6 Because the crime was committed on an Indian reservation, appellant Antelope was charged under the felonymurder provisions of the federal-enclave murder statute as
made applicable to Antelope by the Major Crimes Act.'0 7 Antelope argued that his conviction of felony-murder was racially
discriminatory and violated his equal protection rights. 0 8 He
maintained that a non-Indian charged under the same set of
circumstances would not have been convicted of felony-murder,
which carries a harsher penalty. 10 9 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that the federal criminal statutes did not
violate equal protection because the statutes were not based on
racial classifications. 10
In addition, the Court stated that it was of no consequence
that the federal law differed from state law as long as it was
applied evenhandedly.' The Court reasoned that because the
federal statutes provided Native Americans with all the procedural benefits and privileges of any other federal statute and
treated Native Americans the same as any other individual
112
falling under federal jurisdiction, they were constitutional.
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the
disproportionate impact of § 5032 of the FJDA is unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the validity of the certification provisions of § 5032 as applied toward Native American
juveniles.

113

106. See id. at 642-43.
107. See id. at 642-44; see also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the Major Crimes Act).
108. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642-44.
109. See id. If Antelope were non-Indian he would not have been convicted
of felony-murder because the Major Crimes Act does not apply to non-Indian
defendants, and the state in which the reservation was located did not have a
felony-murder statute.
110. See id. at 645. The Court explained that expressly singling out Indian
tribes as subjects of legislation is expressly provided for by the Constitution
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Court further explained that the classification of Indians is supported by the "ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with Indians." Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645.
111. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 647-50.
112. See id. at 649.
113. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1988).
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2. United States v. Juvenile Male: Is Failure To Require
Certification as to Tribal Authority Constitutional?
In United State v. Juvenile Male, an Indian juvenile argued
that he was the victim of an impermissible race distinction because the first two certification provisions 1 4 of § 5032 deprived
him of the benefit of local treatments programs.1 1 5 He argued
that because § 5032 did not require certification with respect to
tribal authority, the statute violated his equal protection
rights. 116 The appellant maintained that if he were non-Indian,
he would only be subject to federal jurisdiction if the Attorney
General could prove that the state did not (or refused to) exercise jurisdiction and that no adequate delinquency programs
were available, or that a substantial federal interest was involved.1 1 7 In contrast, because states rarely exercise jurisdiction over Native Americans, the first two certification provisions were automatically met to provide federal jurisdiction
over his case. 18 The court responded that because the differences in treatment were a result of the juvenile's political
membership in an Indian tribe rather than his race, this disparity did not violate equal protection.1 1 9 Although Juvenile
Male did not expressly apply the rational basis test, it reasoned
that exercising federal jurisdiction over serious offenses would
be more appropriate because federal law limits the punishment
can impose to a $5,000 fine or one-year imprisontribal courts
0
ment.12
II. COMBINING FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
POLICY WITH AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: AN UNJUST
RESULT
Subjecting Indian juveniles to the Sentencing Guidelines
based purely on their jurisdictional status does not serve the
interests of justice. Although punishing Indian juveniles more
114. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
115. See Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d at 645.
116. See id.
117. See id.; supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (describing the certification process).
118. See Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d at 645; supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text (describing Major Crimes Act and its application on Indian territory
in non-Public Law 280 states).
119. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d at 645.
120. See id.; supra note 4 (discussing the federal restrictions on tribal court

fines).
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harshly may be lawful or even constitutional in theory, this
12
practice is in direct conflict with the purpose of the FJDA. '
Allowing for the transfer of Indian juveniles, regardless of
whether their respective tribe is willing and able to assume jurisdiction, undermines the federal government's policy of recognizing juvenile delinquency as a state and local problem and
threatens the remaining vestiges of tribal sovereignty. 22 The
current system not only disregards congressional intent to only
adjudicate serious felony offenses, but it also contradicts the
Sentencing Guidelines' goal of reducing the occurrences in
defendants receive longer sentences than white
which minority
123
defendants.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY VERSUS PRACTICALITY
Although the FJDA is technically constitutional, its effect
on Native American juveniles is neither rational nor reasonable. The statute provides that the federal government will
only assume jurisdiction over the most serious violent felonies. 124 In practice, however, the FJDA subjects most Indian
juveniles to federal prosecution-not solely those who have
committed serious violent felonies. 125 For example, in United
States v. Dion L., Judge Black granted the government's motion
for transfer as an adult not because Dion L. had committed the
most serious violent crime, but because he did not feel that five
years was a sufficient amount of time to rehabilitate Dion and
protect the public's safety. 126 Exposing Native American juveniles to the harsher penalties of the adult criminal justice system solely because the federal system does not have adequate
juvenile facilities 127 or cannot detain the juvenile for an ade121. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (explaining that the
purpose of the FJDA is to remove juveniles from the criminal process and encourage treatment and rehabilitation).
122. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing policy regarding
Indian sovereignty).
123. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing racially disparate sentencing and the Sentencing Guidelines).
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
126. 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1224-25 (D.N.M. 1998). Judge Black stated that
because the FJDA would only permit the incarceration of Dion for a maximum
of five years, he was forced to allow Dion's transfer as an adult where he
would be incarcerated "with repeat offenders for decades." Id. at 1225.
127. The Federal Bureau of Prisons does not have its own juvenile facilities, forcing the federal government to contract with both private and public
juvenile facilitates that provide counseling and rehabilitation services. See id.
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quate period of time is not rationally tied to the FJDA's overall
purpose. Rather than keeping less serious offenders out of the
criminal process and prosecuting only the most serious Indian
juvenile offenders, the system facilitates the criminal prosecution of mainly Indian juveniles.
Furthermore, while federal adjudication of cases involving
a substantial federal interest is justifiable, failure to determine
tribal jurisdiction and the availability of tribal juvenile facilities before proceeding against an Indian juvenile committing a
less serious offense is unreasonable. Congress expressly provided that as long as state (or local) authorities are able or
willing to exercise jurisdiction over the juvenile and the state
has adequate programs for the juvenile's needs, federal courts
will continue to defer to state authorities for less serious juvenile offenses. 128 But because § 5032 of the FJDA does not expressly require a certification as to tribal authority, the federal
government readily assumes jurisdiction over Native American
juveniles regardless of whether the tribal system is better
equipped to handle the youth. 129 This practice of taking tribal
disputes from the reservation and placing them in federal court
deprives Indian juveniles of the benefits of local treatment pro130
grams that may be more appropriate for their rehabilitation.

at 1227. Unfortunately, however, contracts change frequently and "juveniles
are often assigned depending on where space is then available." Id.
128. See id.
129. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1988).
In reaching its conclusion that certification as to tribal authority was not required, Juvenile Male incorrectly assumed that the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all acts covered under the Major Crimes Act.
See id. It is still unsettled whether the Major Crimes Act deprives tribal court
of jurisdiction over crimes covered under the Major Crimes Act. See supra
note 78 and accompanying text. Juvenile Male also implied that because Congress had limited the punishment a tribe could impose, tribal courts were illequipped to oversee the prosecution of serious juvenile offenders. See Juvenile
Male, 864 F.2d at 645. Many tribal courts, however, rely on mediation and
arbitration rather than punishment to resolve their disputes, making the federal limit on sentence length irrelevant. See, e.g., Gomez, supra note 88, at
377 n.105 ("[Tihe ultimate goal of sanctions within many tribal systems is a
reconcilability of interests between the tribal community and the offender.").
130. See Gomez, supra note 88, at 377 n.104 (stating that "despite the clear
intention of the Indian [sic] Major Crimes Act to bring all major crimes into
federal court, there is still a strong interest in allowing tribes to control their
own dispute resolution mechanisms").
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B. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE: DID CONGRESS INTEND TO
PUNISH NATIVE AMERICAN JUVENILES MORE SEVERELY THAN
NON-INDIANS?

Although § 5032 provides for federal adjudication of Indian and non-Indian juveniles, Congress did not deliberately
intend that the vast majority of juveniles subjected to the federal criminal justice system and the Sentencing Guidelines
would be Native American. Neither the Major Crimes Act nor
the FJDA contemplated this point. In fact, the FJDA only
mentions Native Americans in the context of the tribal opt-in
provision. 13 1 Even though federal authority to prosecute young
offenders may have increased over the years, the government
continues to profess that federal criminal prosecution is not appropriate for most juvenile offenders and that state and 1local
32
authorities are better equipped to handle juvenile matters.
When Congress provides for Indian juveniles to be processed through the federal criminal justice system, and the possibility of transferring a juvenile to adult status applies to all
juveniles who fall under the FJDA's jurisdiction, then the federal prosecution of those juveniles becomes at least theoretically possible. 133 It does not necessarily follow, however, that
Congress deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate to
subject primarily Indian juveniles to the adult criminal justice
system.
Congress enacted the FJDA for many reasons that were
unrelated to the federal prosecution of Native American juveniles. For example, Congress initially enacted the FJDA to
provide federal leadership and coordination in the efforts to develop programs for the prevention and treatment of juvenile
delinquency. 134 Similarly, when Congress enacted the FJDA it
prescribed a preference for state and local treatment, recognizing that juvenile matters are best handled by state authori-

131. See supra note 53 (describing the tribal opt-in provision).
132. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1030 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3530.
133. A similar analysis may be found in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reasoned that because
the Oklahoma legislature did not deliberately choose to authorize capital
punishment for crimes committed at the age of fifteen, the Court could not assume that the legislature authorized the death penalty for some fifteen-year
old felons. See id. at 853.
134. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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ties. 135 These reasons contradict the notion that Congress believed Indian juvenile matters were best handled by federal
prosecutors. 136 Nor is there any evidence that Congress directly considered that the intersection between the FJDA and
the Major Crimes Act would lead to the federal prosecution of
primarily Indian juveniles. There is no legislative history suggesting that Congress considered this implication when it en37
acted the FJDA.'
Furthermore, the assumption of federal jurisdiction over
Indian juveniles invades upon tribal sovereignty. In United
States v. Wheeler,138 the Supreme Court held that a federal
statute appearing to invade on tribal sovereignty would not be
so read, absent a clear statement to the contrary. 139 Thus, even
though § 5032 does not expressly provide for certification as to
tribal authority, courts should presume that certification is required, absent statutory language or congressional intent to the
contrary. Instead of reading congressional silence in favor of
tribal sovereignty, Juvenile Male incorrectly held that the federal government could exercise jurisdiction over Indian juvenile
matters without requiring certification of tribal authority. 140
Because the statute does not expressly abrogate tribal sovereignty, § 5032 should only apply to Native American juveniles
if the Attorney General finds that the tribe lacks jurisdiction or

135. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, reprinted in 1984
U.S.O.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
136. See Gomez, supra note 88, at 377 (discussing separatist relationship
between tribal and American legal systems); Shepherd, supra note 5, at 45
(stating that § 5032 establishes a strong presumption against federal prosecution). Section 5032 never expressly mentions Native American juveniles. See
18 U.S.C. § 5032.
137. See S. REP. NO. 93-1011 (1974); supra notes 10-18 (describing the purpose of the FJDA as avoiding the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and encouraging treatment and rehabilitation).
138. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The Wheeler Court proclaimed that "[flederal
pre-emption of a tribe's jurisdiction to punish its own members for infractions
of tribal law would detract substantially from tribal self-government." Id. at
332.
139. See id. at 332; see also Frickey, supra note 56, at 418 n.158 (stating
that the canons of interpretation are "designed to promote narrow interpretation of federal treaties, statutes, and regulations that intrude upon Indian
self-determination and to promote broad interpretation of provisions that
benefit Indians").
140. United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1988).
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adequate juvenile facilities.' 4 1 Doing otherwise flouts congressional intent and tribal sovereignty.
Finally, Congress expressly provided that federal courts
would only prosecute the most serious instances of juvenile
criminal conduct. 42 Again, there is no indication that Congress
deliberately intended that Native Americans would be the exception to the rule. The statutory and legislative history are
silent in this respect. 43 Without intentionally providing that
Native American juveniles would be treated differently under
the statute, subjecting Indian juveniles to federal prosecution
for typical state law crimes, such as assault or burglary, is not
in the interest of justice and infringes upon tribal sovereignty.1 44 Furthermore, a primary goal of the Sentencing
Guidelines was to address the fact that minority defendants receive longer sentences than their white counterparts.' 45 The
disproportionate consequences that Indian juveniles face as a
result of their transfer to adult status within the federal system
directly contradicts this goal and undermines our criminal justice system.

141. Frickey, supra note 56, at 417 (stating that "the Supreme Court has
long applied a clear-statement requirement to congressional acts that appear
to invade tribal sovereignty"). Currently, the Attorney General is only required to obtain tribal consent for the criminal prosecution of Indian juveniles
between the ages of thirteen and fourteen. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; H.R. REP.
NO. 103-465 (1994).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1845 ("The Committee intends this legislation to allow the Federal government to prosecute as adults those juveniles who have
committed truly heinous and egregious crimes and who show little likelihood
of responding to rehabilitative efforts."); H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, at 389 (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529.
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; S. REP. No. 105-108, at 1 (1997); H.R. REP. No.
103-465, at 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839; H.R. REP. No. 981030, at 1 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
144. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-108, at 182. (Additional, Minority, and Supplemental Views) (declaring that Native Americans, as opposed to any "other
group of Americans, bearO the burden of living exclusively in Federal enclaves
and therefore no other group of Americans is subject to Federal law for typical
State law crimes like robbery or assault").
145. See United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (D.N.M.
1996); Lear, supra note 87, at 1189-92; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994) (explaining that "[t]he [Sentencing] Commission shall assure that the guidelines
and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders").
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III. REMEDIAL OPTIONS: TRIBAL CONSENT AND
YOUTHFULNESS AS A MITIGATING FACTOR
In order to rectify the disparate impact produced by § 5032,
Congress must amend the statute to require tribal authority
certification for less serious offenses. Recognizing tribal jurisdiction over Native American juveniles would better reflect the
federal government's goal of removing juveniles from less appropriate federal channels and promoting tribal selfgovernance. 146 Congress initially enacted the FJDA to provide
for the rehabilitation of juveniles. Today, the federal system
has taken a more punitive approach towards juvenile offenders
that may not be in accordance with Indian tribes' cultural or
moral values. Currently, the certification provisions respect a
state's juvenile delinquency policy, which may be very different
than the federal government's policy, but do not grant the same
courtesy towards tribal governments. Allowing tribal governments to adjudicate their own youth promotes the interests of
the juvenile and the tribal government's ability to manage its
own affairs. 147 Furthermore, the certification provisions would
only require the Attorney General to defer to the tribal government if the tribe had original jurisdiction over the youth
and adequate treatment facilities for the treatment or rehabilitation of the juvenile. 148 The federal government would still
maintain jurisdiction over violent felony offenses in which the
149
federal government has a substantial federal interest.
In addition, Congress should provide alternative sentencing options for less serious youthful offenders who are transferred to adult status. Congress could accomplish this by allowing federal judges to formally recognize "youthfulness" as a

146. See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974); Department of Justice Policy, supra
note 85 (explaining that the federal government has a "fundamental policy of
federal respect for tribal self-government").
147. Although Native American tribal courts vary from one reservation to
another, they closely resemble state and federal courts. See PEVAE, supranote
83, at 85-86. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
which authorized Indian tribes to establish their own courts. See 25 U.S.C. §§
461-94 (1994). The IRA promoted a broad policy of Indian self-government
and authorized tribes to establish their own courts and draft their own laws
subject to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior's approval. See PEVAR, supra note
83, at 86.
148. See supra text accompanying note 23.
149. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. In order to meet a potential influx ofjuvenile cases, the tribal government should also be allowed to
opt out of the sentencing restrictions Congress has placed on them.
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mitigating factor for less serious juvenile criminal acts. 150 For
example, where federal courts would allow the transfer of Indian juveniles primarily because the juvenile system is not able
to detain the individual for an adequate period of time, 15 1 the
judge or jury would be able to consider the mitigating effect of
the defendant's age in evaluating his culpability and in imposing his sentence. 152 The court would then be allowed to use
youthfulness to provide a more appropriate sentence without
excusing the youth's criminal conduct. 153 Protecting juveniles
from the full penal consequences of their actions would more
accurately54reflect federal emphasis on rehabilitation over punishment1
Congress could also create a sentencing formula whereby
an Indian juvenile would be required to serve 50-60% of her
federal sentence as opposed to 85% of her sentence. 55 For example, the courts could adopt the concept of "youth discount"
that represents a sliding scale of criminal responsibility for
younger offenders at sentencing. 156 The youth discount approach rests upon the belief that juveniles are less culpable
than adult offenders because of their limited capacity to make
responsible choices.' 57 This approach would reduce sentencing
based on the defendant's age. 158 Accordingly, thirteen year-old
juveniles would face shorter criminal sentences than juveniles
nearing their eighteenth birthday. 59 In the alternative, Congress could create intermediate sentencing guidelines that
would automatically reflect the sentence reduction and would
apply only to those juveniles who are subject to federal prosecution based on their jurisdictional status. Both of these options
150. See Feld, supra note 16, at 116 (describing "youthfulness" as a mitigating factor in state courts); supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (describing how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines specifically prohibit the use of
offender characteristics, such as age or race, to justify a departure from a federal guidelines sentence).
151. See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text.
152. See Feld, supra note 16, at 99.
153. See id. at 100.
154. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (explaining that the
purpose of the FJDA is to encourage treatment and rehabilitation, rather than
punishment, because juveniles are unable to fully appreciate the consequences
of their acts due to immaturity and lack of experience).
155. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
156. See Feld, supra note 16, at 118-19.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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would provide a tighter correlation between the nature of the
offense and the rehabilitation potential of the juvenile offender.160 Furthermore, the sentencing alteration would reduce
the disparity between state and federal sentencing of Indian
juveniles and provide for a more equitable judicial system.
Congress's failure to adopt these measures reflects a misunderstanding of the relationship between the United States
and Native American tribes. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee has argued against increased tribal authority
over juvenile offenders because, it claims, it will create sentencing disparities, not uniformity. 16' The Committee asserts
that because federal law limits the amount of punishment a
tribe may impose on a criminal defendant, 162 persons committing murder, rape, robbery, or burglary in Indian country would
receive a maximum of one-year imprisonment.16 3 This, the
Committee asserts, is unreasonable and violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.1' 4 What the Committee fails to consider, however, is
that Congress could readily prevent this problem by lifting the
limitations it has imposed on tribal sentencing and fines. Lifting the limitations would provide further impetus for Congress's efforts to strengthen tribal self-governance and it would
allow persons committing more serious crimes to be punished
accordingly.
Notwithstanding these restrictions, however, allowing
tribes to penalize their members in accordance with their own
methods of punishment and restitution would not violate equal
protection. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, legislation benefiting or burdening tribal members is presumed
constitutional and only warrants a rational basis review.165
Surely, granting tribes the ability to experiment with progressive solutions to the escalating problem of juveniles who commit violent crimes is rationally tied to Congress's unique obligation toward Indian tribes. 166 This is especially true in light of
160. See id. at 119.
161. See S. REP. NO. 105-108, at 76-80 (1997).
162. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163. See S. REP. NO. 105-108, at 77.
164. See id.
165. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
166. See S. REP. No. 105-108, at 3 (stating that the federal government
should not impose specific strategies or programs on the states but should en-.
courage states to experiment with their own solutions to the growing problem
of increased violent juvenile offenses).
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the fact that the vast majority of the victims of juvenile crime
committed by Native Americans are Native American.
CONCLUSION
The procedural safeguards provided by the FJDA serve
only to ensure that all but the most serious non-Indian juvenile
offenders remain in the state system. In contrast, Native
Americans are readily funneled into the federal system, regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the tribe's ability or
willingness to exercise jurisdiction over its tribal member. Furthermore, once Native American juveniles are under federal jurisdiction, the decision to prosecute the juvenile as an adult is
more likely to be based upon the length of the defendant's possible incarceration rather than the egregiousness of the juvenile's offense.
In order to remedy this contradiction, Congress should presume tribal court jurisdiction over Indian juveniles for less serious offenses and provide tribal courts the opportunity to sanction their members with more appropriate measures.
In
addition, Congress should create alternative sentencing options
for those juvenile offenders subject to the Sentencing Guidelines purely because of their status as American Indians.
These sentencing options could entail either reestablishing
"youthfulness" as a mitigating factor or implementing a youth
discount sliding scale. Giving federal judges the discretion to
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines would be the right step
toward ensuring that Indian juveniles' punishment would more
accurately fit their crime and their rehabilitation potential.

